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Abstract
In his earlier work, Nivola displayed his ability to urge acceptance of controversial viewpoints.
In his most recent work, Regulating Unfair Trade,’ Mr. Nivola has outdone himself. Even those
who disagree with some of his analyses and conclusions will acknowledge that his views are
informed and balanced. Furthermore, his presentation is thorough and his style is easy to follow.
Mr. Nivola divides the discussion into seven chapters. In the first chapter, “Gulliver’s Travail,”
he describes the objective for his enterprise. In the second chapter, he maps out the terrain. In
chapter three, he sets the general tone for the discussion. In chapter four, he examines specific
grievances referred to as ”war stories.” In chapter five and six, he compares the legislative and
executive approaches to the problem of regulation. In chapter seven, he recommends solutions to
the problem.
BOOK REVIEW
REGULATING UNFAIR TRADE. By Pietro S. Nivola, Wash-
ington, D.C., the Brookings Institution, 1993. xviii & 190 pp.
ISBN 0-8157-6090-6. Cloth, $31.95.
Reviewed by Victor Essien *
In The Politics of Energy Conservation,' Pietro S. Nivola ex-
amined U.S. energy development and conservation against the
backdrop of internal and global politics. In this earlier work,
Nivola displayed his ability to urge acceptance of controversial
viewpoints. In his most recent work, Regulating Unfair Trade,'
Mr. Nivola has outdone himself. Even those who disagree with
some of his analyses and conclusions will acknowledge that his
views are informed and balanced. Furthermore, his presenta-
tion is thorough and his style is easy to follow.
Mr. Nivola divides the discussion into seven chapters. In
the first chapter, "Gulliver's Travail," he describes the objec-
tive for his enterprise. In the second chapter, he maps out the
terrain. In chapter three, he sets the general tone for the dis-
cussion. In chapter four, he examines specific grievances re-
ferred to as "war stories." In chapter five and six, he compares
the legislative and executive approaches to the problem of reg-
ulation. In chapter seven, he recommends solutions to the
problem.
In the first chapter, Nivola asserts that the book addresses
an "ambitious regulatory program," namely, "America's effort
to combat objectionable trading practices of other countries."3
He recalls the immediate post-war period when the United
States dominated the world economy and for economic and
political reasons turned a blind eye to the trade foibles of other
nations.4 Nivola identifies certain changes that seemed to
threaten the U.S. hegemony over the world economy, and con-
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sequently affected its attitude towards regulation.5 Trade be-
came a significant share of the Gross National Product at a
time when imports far outstripped exports. Although the
country was more dependent on export-led growth, seven
rounds of unilateral regulations under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") left the U.S. market more ex-
posed than those of other countries.'
Nivola, however, notes the existence of public indifference
and dissension in governmental policy over the need for regu-
lation.7 Added to this was what he terms "a regulatory para-
dox."8 Regulation of foreign trade expanded during a period
when the U.S. government was curtailing its role in important
sectors of the domestic economy like transportation, energy,
and telecommunication. 9 The U.S. expansion in trade regula-
tion took the form of hundreds of anti-dumping suits, counter-
vailing duties and hints of other retaliatory sanctions. Nivola
concludes that all of these yielded mixed results and distracted
national attention from other primary tasks, such as healing
the budget deficit, resuscitating the national rate of saving, and
rehabilitating the nation's human capital.' 0
In chapter two, Nivola, like Jonathan Swift's Gulliver, in-
troduces the land of "Lilliput, Brobdingnag, Laputa,
Balnibarbe, Luggnagg, Glubbdubdrib, Houyhnhnms and Ja-
pan."" Similar to Jonathan Swift, Nivola in this chapter, lays
claim to literary license. He attempts to persuade the reader
that more regulation cannot assure a level playing field. So
intent is he in this advocacy that he sometimes makes un-
proven statements. For instance, in the face of several disloca-
tions in the iron and steel industries, he points to unfavorable
exchange rates and the failings of the local industry as the cul-
prits and not foreign trade.' 2
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 3-6.
9. Id. at 15.
10. Id. at 18.
11. JONATHAN SwirT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS (P. Dixon &J. Chalker eds. 1967). In
this work, Gulliver travels to several nations of the world. Nivola obviously sees his
excursion into trade regulation as akin to Jonathan Swift's Gulliver's Travels with
part of its satirical overtones. Id.
12. Nivola, supra note 2, at 21.
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Secondly, he insinuates that because of the impossibility
of measuring the extent and severity of unwarranted foreign
trade distortion there can be no basis for believing that there is
a malicious environment for merchandise trade.' 3 He also at-
tempts to prove that non-tariff protection has not slowed down
global trade and that "the growth of non-tariff barriers in the
1980s was almost certainly being offset by unilateral tariff re-
ductions."'1 4 Furthermore, confronted with the high incidence
of dumping and predatory pricing of the Japanese, he explains
that this "reflected redefinitions of 'unfair' pricing rather than
a highest incidence of production and price-gouging."' 5
Finally, he contends that, in spite of recent U.S. trade pol-
icy, the United States has enjoyed remarkable growth during
the past decade.' 6 He claims that the "overall effect of sec-
tional market opening actions was small in comparison with
the effect of currency realignments, improvements in U.S.
manufacturing productivity and other macroeconomic
forces."'17
In chapter three, Nivola discusses the Politics of Remedia-
tion. To prove the dangers and irrelevance of trade regula-
tion, Nivola links the electoral defeats of Walter Mondale,
Richard Gephardt, Robert Dole, Pat Robertson, Tom Haskin,
and Robert Kerrey to their positions on the trade issue.' 8 Such
an assertion is undoubtedly controversial and hard to substan-
tiate.
These biases aside, Nivola has written a very instructive
book. He is particularly skilled at demonstrating the close re-
lationship between law, politics and economics in the interna-
tional trade arena. In the chapter entitled "War Stories,' 9
Nivola describes the hopelessness of the institutional arrange-
ments aimed at insulating the policy process against the pres-
sures of politics. Nivola describes how after the debacle of the
1930 Tariff Act, the legislative and executive branches agreed
on the need to "hold renewed protectionist reflexes in
13. Id. at 26.
14. Id. at 26-28.
15. Id. at 48.
16. Id. at 49.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 57.
19. Id. at 69.
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check."' 2' The legislature surrendered some of its authority to
the courts and various regulatory agencies including the Inter-
national Trade Commission (ITC), the International Trade
Administration of the Commerce Department (ITA), the Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the Court of In-
ternational Trade (CIT).2' These adjudicatory bodies would
buy off the anger of aggrieved industries by offering token pro-
tection in legitimate instances that would not interfere with the
general flow of commerce. 22
Nivola, however, provides three interesting cases where
this carefully crafted script has not been followed and where
political issues came into play. The first of these cases is what
he calls the "textile tangle" involving a coalition of U.S. textile
and apparel companies and their petition to the Department of
Commerce to act against subsidized textile products from
mainland China in September 1983.23 The coalition claimed
that the illegal subsidy stemmed from China's dual exchange
rate. The petition was in effect a reaction to the August 1983
U.S.-China Trade Accord restricting annual growth of Chinese
textile exports to the U.S. from 2.5% to 3.5%.24 The coalition
referred to this deal as "a disaster."
In addition, Nivola explains that for political reasons the
Reagan administration avoided an ITA ruling on the petition
by promising to and actually signing another accord in Decem-
ber 1983 with Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and China
aimed at systematically monitoring and controlling textile im-
ports from these countries.25 This accord, however, did not
end the textile controversy.26 Since 1961 the domestic textile
and apparel manufacturers had been protected by an increas-
ing number of trade restrictions." By 1990 more than 1,000
quotas existed with thirty-eight nations, covering three-
quarters of all imports. 28 Nivola contends that with an average
duty of 20% on these products, this situation costs American
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 71.
23. Id. at 73.
24. Id. at 74.
25. Id. at 75.
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consumers $20 billion a year for the clothes they buy.29
Nivola relates two additional "war stories," involving the
Canadian lumber industry and the Japanese construction in-
dustry."0 Unlike the controversy surrounding the textile indus-
try, these events did not yield excessive dollar losses to U.S.
consumers. However, in both the Canadian and Japanese epi-
sodes, "[w]hat began, seemingly, as a technical administrative
exercise involving a few low-level participants and limited
stakes, gradually drew in the rest of the government, raising
tempers, altering expectations, and sometimes extending the
conflicts."''3
In chapter five, Nivola considers the politics of trade legis-
lation. He characterizes legislative activity to be of two kinds:
theatrical gestures and substantive enactments .32 Further-
more, Nivola traces how both forms of legislative activity have
impelled various trade legislation including the Trade Act of
1974, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the Trade and Tariff
Act of 1984, and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988.33 Nivola is more concerned with how the legislation
came into being than with how the legislation functions. Con-
cluding that the cumulative effect of the legislative activity has
become significant, Nivola asserts that "an extensive patch-
work of regulations was being pieced together, with new layers
repeatedly stitched to older ones."13 4
In chapter six, Nivola turns his attention to the functions
of the executive. Examining the historical context of the exec-
utive's function, Nivola recognizes that the executive who
"could check and balance the pressures for measures regulat-
ing foreign trade... also contributed to them."3 5 In addition,
Nivola characterizes the executive-legislative interactions in
trade matters variously as a "marriage of convenience," a
"complex partnership," and a "good cop, bad cop" routine.3 6
All characterizations are correct. Nivola further suggests that
29. Id.
30. Id. at 73.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 91.
33. See id. at 91-107 (discussing details of various trade legislation).
34. Id. at 108.
35. Id. at 110.
36. Id. at 122.
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unlike Congress, the executive tends to subordinate trade con-
flicts to more fundamental domestic concerns, especially those
concerning war and peace.3 7 Yet, he accurately states that the
"conventional model of interbranch politics, in which the legis-
lature is forever pushing interventionist projects that the exec-
utive indefatigably resists, is an oversimplification."s3
Although the partnership between the executive and
lawmakers is advantageous to both, Nivola questions whether
their complex relationship offers them the "political slack they
need to start solving economic problems more fundamental
than foreign trading practices."3 9
Nivola's final chapter is devoted to providing some solu-
tions for the trade policy dilemma. He first sums up the pres-
ent situation as follows:
Although the international trading system was generating
fierce competitive pressures, for the most part the pressures
and the system were not less 'fair' than in the past. Despite
speculation about rising foreign protectionism and a mori-
bund GATT, world trade and welfare grew throughout the
1980s, and by the end of the decade, our robust export sec-
tors were leading the parade. To be sure, adversarial eco-
nomic practices continued to interfere. Industrial targeting
and predatory pricing could endanger strategic U.S. export
industries.4"
Furthermore, Nivola explains that:
[M]ost of the complaints about harmful subsidizing and
dumping did not involve them. Moreover, many complaints
reflected changes in conceptions of fairness rather than in-
creases in pernicious subsidies or pricing strategies.4'
Against this background, Nivola notes that commentators
usually make one of the following three recommendations.
One group urges suspension of the regulatory campaign
against unfair trade. In contrast, the second proposes that
government manage trading relations on a larger scale. The
third group suggests that the government should train its in-
terventionist's arsenal on structural sources of competitive
37. Id. at 113.
38. Id. at 127.
39. Id. at 128.
40. Id. at 131.
41. Id.
1992-1993] 1327
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erosion in the domestic economy.42
Nivola contends that "[s]omewhere along the continuum
of theoretical policy options lies common sense," which he
translates as pressing for equitable rules of foreign trade while
carrying out the economic changes needed to make govern-
ment a better partner of industry at home.43 Nivola recom-
mends that the "[h]ighest priority should go to fostering a ro-
bust rate of productivity growth by raising the level of public
and private savings, curbing the costs of health care, creating a
less adversarial regulatory environment and equipping the la-
bor force for the work it will have to do."4 4
While these basic changes are gradually being imple-
mented, Nivola offers some mid-range suggestions in order to
make trade decisions that "complement, rather than
subordinate, the primary agenda."'45 Nivola advises that the
safeguard mechanism under GATT, which is-section 201 of the
1974 Trade Act, should be pressed into service more often to
provide emergency relief to U.S. industries that are seriously
impaired by trade. He cautions, however, that the injury
threshold and the norms for causality addressed in section 201
needs to be revised if the legislation is to become more attrac-
tive." In addition, Nivola maintains that the anti-dumping leg-
islation needs re-tooling. In particular, he contends that the
injury test should relate not only to the industry but to the
country's national welfare and security. Presumably, if the
pricing in question favors competition and will bring a net ben-
efit to the U.S. economy then the petitioner should lose OUt. 4 7
Nivola's other mid-range suggestions relate to strengthening
the unilateral GATT process to challenge trade barriers, pick-
ing trade disputes well and clarifying the institutional responsi-
bilities of both the executive and legislature to trade policy.
Nivola's suggestions and recommendations warrant the at-
42. Id. at 137.
43. Id. at 142.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 144.
46. Id. Nivola does not spend much time discussing how the General Agree-
ments on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) fits into the present regime. Id.
47. Id. at 145. Nivola's criticisms echo the highly critical views of other com-
mentators regarding the enforcement of U.S. unfair trading legislature. DOWN IN THE
DuMps: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAWS (R. Boltuck and R.E. Litan eds.,
1991).
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tention of both those who make and those who are affected by
trade policy. His remarks that trade policy should not mask
the need for more basic economic changes are even more sig-
nificant. Since Nivola's book is concise and not too technical,4 8
it should garner a wide readership.
48. See, e.g., Murray, The Administration of the Antidumping Duty Law by the Depart-
ment of Commerce in DOWN IN THE DUMPS: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAWS
23 (R. Boltuck and R.E. Litan eds., 1991) (discussing technical aspects of administra-
tion of unfair trade laws); see generally, ALI-ABA INTERNATIONAL TRADE FOR THE NON-
SPECIALIST (P.H.Vishny ed., 1992).
